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
 
Employing data for 34,255 loans made by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC) to 12,455 repeat borrowers during the 2002-6 period, this 
article examines the relationship between borrowers’ asset holdings and 
microloan repayment. Estimating a series of binomial probit specifications, it 
finds a positive relationship between land ownership and loan repayment; 
however, taken collectively, ownership of non-land assets diminishes the 
likelihood of repayment. Influences of specific assets on repayment 
probabilities vary across asset types: ownership of land, corrugated tin 
houses, vans and rickshaws increases the likelihood of repayment, while 
ownership of sewing machines, televisions, radios and bicycles corresponds 
with a decreased repayment probability. 
 
 
 
As microfinance has emerged, in recent decades, as one of the most effective, flexible and 
innovative tools in the fight against poverty, loan recovery has remained vital for the 
sustainability of microfinance institutions (MFIs). When determining who is and is not 
creditworthy, MFIs regularly collect information on potential borrowers’ asset holdings, the 
implication being that a borrower in possession of more assets is thought to be less risky 
relative to a comparable individual with fewer assets. Employing data collected from the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), this article considers the extent to 
which asset holdings matter for successful loan repayment. It also considers possible 
variations across asset types in terms of their respective influences on loan repayment.  
Although the literature examines many aspects of microfinance, including the 
determinants of loan repayment or default, to our knowledge this is the first study that 
considers the holdings of specific asset types as determinants of microloan repayment.
1
 
Godquin (2004) examines the influences of productive and non-productive assets, 
generally, on loan repayment but does not consider the influences of specific asset types. In 
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evaluating the relationship between specific assets and loan repayment, we provide 
valuable information that adds to the collective knowledge regarding microloan repayment. 
Such information may increase lending efficiency and have a positive effect on repayment 
rates, thus promoting the sustainability and, potentially, the scale and scope of microcredit.  
A common microfinance practice is for loan officers to speak with a potential 
borrower’s neighbours, relatives and friends to help gauge the individual’s 
creditworthiness. That applicants are also asked to report asset holdings suggests that 
lenders consider assets to be an important determinant of loan repayment. Higher asset 
values may indicate a borrower’s past financial success or their productivity. Likewise, 
greater asset holdings may foster a higher likelihood of loan repayment if borrowers can 
liquidate their assets, if/when necessary, to meet repayment obligations. Finally, a 
borrower’s assets may signal the wealth or income of extended family – a valuable 
potential source of funds for the borrower to draw upon, if necessary. However, higher 
asset holdings may also reflect a higher marginal propensity to consume and a diminished 
capacity to repay a loan. Similarly, loan repayment may be hindered if higher asset 
holdings are indicative of a high discount rate and corresponding low savings. As 
differences in the composition of assets held may reflect variation in entrepreneurial talents 
across borrowers and, thus, differences in borrowers’ abilities to repay loans, the seemingly 
intuitive relationship between asset holdings and the probability of successful loan 
repayment may be less straightforward than one might expect and, accordingly, remains an 
open empirical question.  
As well as inquiring about asset holdings, the BRAC membership application asks 
borrowers to divulge general household and demographic information. In surveying BRAC 
area offices, we collected data from the membership applications of a random sample of 
borrowers. In addition to information regarding asset holdings, the data include borrower 
demographics and household characteristics. To complete our data set, we matched these 
data to the corresponding borrowers’ loan information and monthly repayment histories, 
which were obtained from BRAC’s main office. Our data represent 34,255 loans taken by 
12,455 repeat borrowers during the 2002-6 period. To discern the influence of asset 
holdings on repayment likelihoods, we estimate a series of binomial probit specifications: 
regressing a dichotomous dependent variable that represents successful loan repayment on a 
set of explanatory variables that includes measures of asset holdings as well as additional 
control variables. As our data include only loans made to those individuals who have been 
considered creditworthy, we effectively consider whether asset holdings affect the 
likelihood of repayment among borrowers who hold assets at or in excess of a threshold 
deemed acceptable by the lender. 
Our analysis yields interesting results and relationships. We find that ownership of 
land is positively correlated with successful loan repayment; however, ownership of non-
land assets, taken in total, is negatively related with the probability of repayment. In 
addition, we find considerable heterogeneity across asset types in terms of their influences 
on repayment probabilities. Broadly speaking, ownership of assets that signal wealth or 
status (specifically, land and houses) and of other assets that are likely to generate income 
(vans and rickshaws) corresponds with an increased probability of loan repayment. 
Ownership of assets that are less likely to generate income (televisions, radios and bicycles 
and furniture/household items) is negatively related with loan repayment. We also find that 
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a number of assets (cows, goats and lambs, and cow-pulled vehicles) are generally 
unrelated to the likelihood of loan repayment. While we report significant relationships 
between assets and repayment, we find that the overall influence of assets on loan 
repayment is not particularly great. When discussing our results in detail, we offer plausible 
explanations for our findings. 
Considering that, in addition to asset holdings, personal and/or family characteristics 
may affect a borrower’s repayment performance, we control for several related factors. We 
find the likelihood that a loan will be repaid is higher if the borrower has taken more loans 
in the past. As one may expect, borrowers who make advance payments during the 
repayment period are more likely to repay their loans, while loans taken by borrowers who 
periodically miss payments are more likely to end in default. Similarly, older borrowers and 
households with more income-earning members have higher repayment probabilities, while 
households with more members in total have lower repayment probabilities. Our findings 
have important policy implications for MFIs and can be used to improve the processes by 
which borrowers are screened and loans are approved. 
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 explains our 
empirical methodology and presents the specific hypotheses to be tested. Estimation results 
are presented and discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
Before discussing the data in detail, it may be instructive to introduce BRAC and briefly 
summarise its lending process. BRAC employs more than 100,000 individuals who provide 
the poor with services related to education, health care, social development and legal 
assistance. As such, it is one of the largest non-governmental organisations in the world. 
The scale and scope of BRAC’s lending are on a par with those of the Grameen Bank, 
making it one of the largest MFIs. BRAC’s microfinance programme targets women, offers 
loans without requiring collateral, and uses a group lending mechanism to promote 
repayment.
2
 While BRAC has three tiers in its microfinance programme, our data are from 
the programme that targets the poorest segment of the population. This programme, known 
as Dabi, comprises 89% of all BRAC borrowers and generally offers loans up to 30,000 
Taka (BDT) – an amount roughly equivalent to US$440. 
When beginning work in a new area, BRAC completes a series of village-specific 
household surveys. These identify the poorest one-half of households in each village. The 
members of these households, if not members of another MFI, are potential BRAC 
programme participants. As programme sustainability is very important, people with at 
least some minimum level of assets are considered for the microfinance programme, while 
the absolutely destitute – who tend to be landless – are considered for a development 
programme known as the Targeted Ultra Poor (TUP) programme. The TUP programme 
provides grants to eligible individuals until they have sufficient assets to become eligible 
for the microfinance programme. Therefore, since the landless are typically considered 
more risky as compared with borrowers who do own land and, thus, often are eligible for 
the TUP programme, a very small fraction of the individuals to whom BRAC lends are 
landless (only 5.5% in our sample). 
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Once the microfinance members have been chosen from this population, BRAC 
creates village organisations (VOs) and assigns a loan officer to each. The VOs consist of 
three to eight micro-groups, each of which has a leader and four other members. Thus, each 
VO has 15 to 40 members. The VO structure is complete when members elect a 
management committee consisting of a chairwoman, a secretary, a commissioner and two 
to five ordinary members.  
The process of taking a loan begins with a micro-group member informing her group 
leader of her desire to borrow. The group leader then proposes the loan at a VO meeting, 
and the proposal is either accepted or rejected through a voice vote. If accepted, then either 
the chairwoman or the secretary informs the BRAC loan officer of the decision. The loan 
officer then completes a loan request form and a loan contract and takes the signatures of 
the potential borrower, micro-group leader, and the chairwoman or secretary. The loan 
officer then reviews the loan proposal and request form and delivers a preliminary decision 
favouring or opposing the loan. If the loan officer is in favour of the proposal, he forwards 
it, along with the request form and contract, to a BRAC accountant who examines the 
borrower’s request form and previous loan information before sending the forms to the 
BRAC area office manager for formal approval. The area office manager reviews the loan 
documents with his staff during their weekly office meeting and, if the loan is formally 
approved, decides when the funds will be disbursed. Following formal approval, the loan 
officer informs the borrower of the loan disbursement date. On the given date, the borrower 
visits the BRAC area office, signs the loan disbursement sheet and loan contract, and the 
loan is then disbursed by the accounting division.  
 
 
As already mentioned, loan-specific data, including complete monthly repayment histories, 
were obtained from the BRAC main office, plus data relating to borrower demographics, 
household characteristics and asset holdings through a survey of BRAC area offices.
3
 From 
the borrowers’ membership applications, we collected detailed information on the asset 
holdings of each borrower’s household. Specifically, we have information on land owned 
(in acres) and the number and total value of several non-land assets: corrugated tin houses; 
cows; goats and lambs; vans and rickshaws; cow-driven vehicles; sewing machines; 
televisions, radios and bicycles; and other miscellaneous assets (typically furniture and/or 
household items/appliances). It is important to note that, while household assets may be 
controlled jointly (perhaps by a husband and wife), or by another member of the household, 
the lender’s expectation regarding loan repayment generally remains the same. If the 
borrower does not control the assets and default appears likely, then the loan officer may 
expect the person controlling the assets to come to the borrower’s aid. The survey data also 
indicate the total number of individuals residing in each borrower’s household, the number 
of income-earner members within the household, and the borrower’s age and marital status. 
The monthly loan repayment histories include information on loan value and duration, 
interest rate, whether any payments were missed or paid in advance, the number of prior 
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is included in the Appendix. 
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loans that each borrower had taken from BRAC, and whether each prior loan was 
successfully repaid.  
To ensure a random sample, data were collected for 50 randomly selected borrowers 
from each of 280 randomly selected BRAC area offices, thus yielding a sample containing 
14,000 borrowers.
4
 The level of detail in the data permits examination of the extent to 
which commonly held assets affect loan repayment. Although a large literature has emerged 
regarding varying aspects of microfinance, to our knowledge our study is the first to 
examine asset holdings, in such a degree of detail/specificity, as determinants of 
microfinance loan repayment. 
 
 
Table A1 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of loans and for 
two sub-samples: loans that were successfully repaid and loans that ended in default. While 
the loan repayment rate is 96.4%, it should be noted that 1,208 borrowers defaulted on 
1,245 of the 33,255 loans in our sample. Thus, the borrower repayment rate is 90.3%. The 
typical loan value is equal to slightly more than one-half (50.7%) of the corresponding 
borrower’s non-land asset holdings (BDT23,056 or about US$340). Land is the most 
commonly-owned asset, with 94.5% of all borrowers holding some amount and the typical 
loan being taken by a borrower owning 1.04 acres. The most prominent non-land asset is 
corrugated tin houses, which account for 70% of the value of the typical borrower’s non-
land asset holdings. A closer inspection of the data reveals that 73.6% of loans are taken by 
borrowers for whom the value of their corrugated tin houses exceeds the combined value of 
all other non-land assets. This indicates that the typical loan is taken by a borrower who has 
low asset holdings relative to their loan value and who lacks diversity in the types of assets 
held. We also see that it is much more common for borrowers to make advance loan 
payments (77.8% of loans involved at least one advance payment) as compared with 
missing at least one payment (16.6%).  
With respect to demographic characteristics, nearly all loans (99.4%) were taken by 
borrowers who were married. The typical loan was taken by a borrower who was 30.8 years 
old and, although the youngest and oldest borrowers were 15 and 55 years of age 
respectively, 67.1% of loans were given to borrowers between the ages of 25 and 35. In 
addition, the typical loan was taken by a member of a household comprising about 4.7 
members; of whom roughly 1.2 were income-earners.  
Given the high loan repayment rate, it is not surprising to find similarities between the 
characteristics of the full sample and those of successfully repaid loans. The only 
significant variations are that successfully repaid loans tend to be smaller in value and have 
lengthier repayment periods than the typical loan. Also, the borrowers who had taken these 
loans had taken relatively smaller loans in the past and were more likely to make at least 
one advance payment. In contrast, when considering loans that end in default, we find that 
borrowers tend to have non-land asset values and loan values that, on average, are greater 
than the typical loan. With respect to specific asset types, these loans are taken by 
borrowers who tend to have less land than the typical borrower and lower values, on 
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average, for goats and lambs and for vans and rickshaws, but higher values for sewing 
machines, televisions, radios and bicycles, and other miscellaneous assets. These borrowers 
also have borrowed more times in the past from BRAC, and their average household size is 
higher than the overall mean. Not surprisingly, these borrowers are more likely to miss 
payments and less likely to make advance payments. 
Table A2 presents a correlation matrix that provides additional useful information. 
Values presented in column (a) indicate that, while land ownership is positively related to 
loan repayment, greater total non-land asset values correspond with a decreased likelihood 
of loan repayment. These relationships and the variation in correlation coefficients between 
certain non-land asset types and successful loan repayment – specifically that corrugated tin 
houses, sewing machines, televisions, radios and bicycles, and other miscellaneous assets 
are negatively correlated with successful loan repayment, while cows, goats and lambs, and 
vans and rickshaws are positively correlated – suggests that heterogeneity exists across 
asset types with respect to loan repayment. Further examination reveals that higher values 
for current and previous loans are strongly and negatively correlated with repayment and 
that borrowers who have taken more loans in the past are less likely to successfully repay a 
loan. This may be explained, at least in part, by the positive relationship between the 
number of prior BRAC loans (row (o)) and the values of current and previous loans 
(columns (l) and (m), respectively).  
 
To discern the relationships between our dependent variable, successful loan repayment, 
and our set of explanatory variables, we estimate a series of binomial probit specifications. 
We adopt the definition of loan default employed by BRAC and categorise a loan as having 
been successfully repaid if full payment is received either during the term of the loan or 
within a four-week grace period following the scheduled loan discharge date. To evaluate 
the relationships between holdings of specific assets and loan repayment, we employ a 
number of separate asset measures as explanatory variables: (i) total values, (ii) average 
values, (iii) unit values, and (iv) asset values as a share of total (non-land) assets. Total 
asset values are the values stated by the borrowers and confirmed by loan officers. Average 
asset values, a measure of asset quality, are derived by dividing total asset values by 
corresponding unit values. Unit values, a measure of asset quantity, are the numbers of each 
asset type held. Thus, the total asset value represents a combination of asset quality and 
asset quantity. Finally, we construct a variable that compares the total values of each asset 
type to the total value of all non-land assets. This variable allows us to consider the 
composition of each borrower’s assets as a determinant of successful repayment.  
Sharma and Zeller (1997) and Godquin (2004) report that higher loan values 
correspond with decreased probabilities of loan repayment. As loan values may be 
endogenously determined (that is, loan values and success of repayment may be determined 
by omitted variables observed by loan officers and BRAC but not available in our data), we 
follow Godquin (2004) and employ the main amount of each borrower’s prior loan as an 
instrument variable for the current loan value. This necessitates censoring our data to 
include only repeat borrowers. We include the duration of the current loan in our 
specification, as lengthier repayment periods, all else being equal, may correspond with an 
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increased likelihood of repayment. We also include the loan interest rate as higher interest 
rates indicate a higher cost of borrowing and, hence, an expected increased likelihood that 
borrowers would face difficulty repaying loans.  
Controlling for the number of previous BRAC loans serves two purposes. The number 
of prior loans taken indicates the number of loan cycles in which the borrower has 
interacted with her micro-group. Thus, it is a proxy for the effects of group dynamics on 
loan repayment. As anecdotal evidence suggests that the composition of groups is unlikely 
to change over time, the variable is an indirect measure of a group’s age. This is similar to 
Godquin’s (2004) explicit use of group age to represent social ties and the 
behaviour/characteristics of group members. Also, as Schreiner (2004) finds, the number of 
payments in arrears decreases as the number of past loans increases. Thus, the number of 
prior loans is a potential measure of borrower reliability. An individual who has 
successfully repaid prior loans may be more likely to repay an additional loan, as compared 
with a borrower who has yet to demonstrate the same degree of creditworthiness.  
Finally, we include two loan-related dummy variables. The first variable is equal to 
one if the borrower missed at least one loan payment during the lifetime of the loan and 
zero if no payments were missed.
5
 The second variable is equal to one if any payments were 
made in advance during the repayment period and zero if no advance payments were made.  
Equation (1) represents our baseline estimation equation in general form. Subscripts i 
and j correspond to loans and borrowers, respectively.  
 
(Pr Success
ij
 = 1) = f(landj, non-land assetsj, prior loan valuej, loan durationi,    (1) 
loan interest ratei, missed paymentsi, advance paymentsi, 
prior BRAC loansj, agej, marital statusj, household membersj,   
income-earning members in householdj) 
 
With respect to borrower characteristics, Vogelgesang (2001a) finds that younger 
borrowers have higher likelihoods of loan default. This may indicate that more mature 
borrowers typically have greater financial solvency/wherewithal and, perhaps, more 
experience in conducting business. In addition, age may correspond with a more prominent 
reputation within the local society and/or connections that may bias a loan officer’s 
decision to approve or refuse a loan. We include both the borrower’s age and its squared 
value as separate explanatory variables to capture potential non-linearity in the age-
repayment relationship. Copestake et al. (2001) and Vogelgesang (2001a) both report that 
married borrowers are more likely to repay loans. This is thought to result from married 
borrowers tending to be more stable, perhaps older and less likely to engage in risky 
projects because of the impact a negative outcome may have on their families. Even though 
nearly all borrowers in our sample are married, we include a dummy variable which is 
equal to one if the borrower is married and equal to zero otherwise.  
                                                          
5. Because repayment history data are reported monthly, a borrower could miss a payment early in a month, make 
up the payment before the month’s end and have a repayment history reflecting that all payments were made 
on time. 
  
 
 
To provide some indication of how household composition may affect repayment, we 
include two variables: the total number of household members and the number of income-
earning members within the household. Based on the findings of Sharma and Zeller (1998), 
we anticipate that more total members within a household will decrease the likelihood of 
repayment, while more income-earning members within a household increases the 
likelihood of repayment.  
 
 
 
Our examination is predicated on the notion that, since assets are an important part of the 
decision-making process by which borrowers are considered for loans, it is reasonable to 
expect assets to be important and significant determinants of repayment probabilities. The 
fact that lenders commonly base evaluations of borrowers’ creditworthiness, in part, on 
asset holdings underscores the notion that asset holdings are viewed as an indicator of 
income and/or financial or business acumen or perhaps of associated family wealth, all of 
which are thought to correspond with a greater ability to repay a loan. We posit that, in 
addition to the level of assets being important for loan repayment, different asset types may 
affect the likelihood of repayment differently. For example, more productive assets may be 
expected to affect the likelihood of repayment differently from less productive assets. Thus, 
we arrive at our first two hypotheses: 
 
H1: Asset holdings are positively correlated with a greater likelihood of loan repayment. 
 
H2: Different asset types (land, vans and rickshaws, cow-pulled vehicles, and so forth) 
affect the likelihood of loan repayment in distinct ways. 
 
Employment of alternative measures of asset holdings (total asset values, asset 
quantities, average asset values, and individual asset values as a share of total (non-land) 
asset values) in our estimations may convey additional and more detailed information about 
the corresponding relationships to loan repayment. For example, for some assets, quality (as 
inferred from average asset values) might have a more pronounced influence on repayment 
probabilities relative to total asset value or the quantity of assets held. This leads to our 
third hypothesis: 
 
H3: Employing different asset measures (for example, total asset values or average asset 
values) will reveal different relationships regarding the likelihood of loan repayment. 
 
We begin our analysis seeking to discern a general relationship between total asset 
values and loan repayment. To this end, we employ land, which is reported in acres owned 
rather than as a monetary value, and the value of total non-land assets to represent 
borrowers’ asset holdings. We then proceed by substituting, in turn, vectors containing 
more detailed asset measures (discussed earlier) for the total non-land assets value and, 
finally, we consider the relationships between repayment and holdings of productive (or 
likely income-generating) assets and non-productive (less likely to generate income) assets. 
Although categorisation of assets is difficult, we base our characterisation of assets as 
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productive or non-productive on whether the asset can likely be used by the borrower to 
generate income or not. Certainly, for some borrowers, exceptions to this categorisation do 
occur. We proceed cautiously with this caveat in place and in mind.  
To control for seasonality in repayment, we append vectors of dummy variables to our 
empirical specification. These include variables that indicate the month and the year during 
which the loan is scheduled to be discharged. Khandker et al. (1995) consider the extent to 
which loan default is influenced by area characteristics. Using Grameen Bank data, the 
authors find that area characteristics influence loan repayment. Similarly, Paxton (1996) 
reports that proximity to urban locations is positively related with loan repayment. Since 
our borrower information is reported at the area office level, we control for potential 
geographical variation in borrowers’ abilities to successfully repay their loans. 
Accordingly, we categorise each loan observation, based on the location of the borrower’s 
area, into one of 13 regions.
6
  
Equation (2) presents our estimation equation, complete with individual asset 
measures and seasonal and geographical fixed effects.  
 
(Pr Successij = 1) = 0 + 1 land j + 2 corrugated tin houses j + 3 cows j (2) 
+ 
4 
goats and lambs j + 5 sewing machines j 
+ 
6 
televisions, radios and bicycles j + 7vans and rickshaws j 
+ 
8
 cow-pulled vehicles j + 9 other miscellaneous assets j 
+ 
1
 previous loan value i + 2 loan duration i + 3 loan interest rate i 
+ 
4
 missed payments i + 5 advance payments i + 1 prior BRAC loans j  
+2 borrower’s age j + 3 borrower’s age2 j + 4 household members j 
+5 income earners in household j + 6 married j + m month  
+y year + r region + ij 
 
 
Marginal effects obtained when estimating equation (2) and its variants using the binomial 
probit technique are presented in Tables A3 to A6. As mentioned, we begin our analysis 
using a measure of the total value of non-land assets. Since we only have information on 
the amount (in acres) of land owned, land is included in our estimation equation as a 
separate variable. We then substitute variables that represent individual asset types for the 
total non-land asset variable so that we may consider their respective influences. As before, 
we employ measures of total asset values, average asset values, number of assets (units), 
                                                          
6. Regions and corresponding shares of all loans within the sample are as follows: Barisal (24.21%), Bogra 
(16.32%), Chandpur (16.21%), Chittagong (17.21%), Comilla (8.12%), Cox’s Bazar (3.28%), Dhaka Urban 
(0.78%), Dinajpur 4.81%), Jatrabari (0.99%), Jessore (3.31%), Khulna (2.88%), Kishoregonj (1.12%), Sylhet 
(0.75%). 
  
 
 
and assets as a share of total non-land assets. We discuss each asset type/measure and 
corresponding set of results in turn, placing particular focus on the previously-stated 
hypotheses.  
Beginning with the results presented in Table A3, we report a consistently positive 
and significant influence of land holdings on loan repayment. The marginal effects for the 
total (non-land) assets variables indicate that a borrower’s asset holdings exert a small but 
significant and negative influence on the likelihood of loan repayment. Two things are 
important to note at this point. First, as mentioned at the outset, since our data represent 
only those who have been deemed creditworthy by loan officers, we are effectively 
considering whether asset holdings matter for repayment among borrowers who are in the 
bottom one-half of households, based on income, but who hold assets at or in excess of an 
acceptable threshold. In other words, it may be that what we are finding is an indication that 
a borrower’s holdings of non-land assets, above some threshold, have only a minor effect 
on repayment likelihoods. Secondly, while the coefficient on the total non-land assets 
variable is negative, greater asset holdings correspond to a higher probability of loan 
repayment if the borrower’s land holdings are sufficiently large relative to total non-land 
asset holdings.  
Marginal effects reported for the remaining variables in Table A3 provide additional 
interesting information. Higher loan values and interest rates correspond to decreased 
likelihoods of loan repayment, while lengthier repayment periods correspond to an 
increased likelihood of loan repayment. As one might expect, loans for which borrowers 
missed at least one payment were more likely to end in default, and loans for which 
borrowers made at least one advance payment were more likely to be successfully repaid. 
Loans taken by borrowers who had taken a greater number of prior BRAC loans were more 
likely to end in successful repayment. Older borrowers and those in households that had 
more income-earning members and/or fewer total members were more likely to 
successfully repay their loans. While the specifications presented in columns (a) to (c) are 
similar, they do vary in terms of controlling for time and region fixed effects. The 
consistency in the magnitudes and signs of marginal effects, across specifications, is taken 
as an indication of the robustness of our preliminary findings. 
Results obtained when substituting the holdings of specific asset types into our 
specification for total non-land assets are presented in Table A4. As before, the marginal 
effects indicate a positive relationship between land and successful loan repayment. Across 
all estimations, corresponding marginal effects are significant and of similar magnitudes. 
Ownership of sewing machines; televisions, radio and bicycles; cow-pulled vehicles and 
other assets (primarily furniture and other household items/appliances) – as measured by 
total value (column (a)), average value (column (b)), units (column (c)), or by each asset as 
a share of total non-land assets (column (d)) – correspond with decreased likelihoods of 
loan repayment. In addition to land holdings, ownership of vans and rickshaws and of 
corrugated tin houses is positively related to successful loan repayment. Coefficients on 
variables representing ownership of livestock (cows, goats and lambs) are consistently 
positive, although insignificant.  
A possible explanation for the observed pattern of variation in terms of the signs and 
significance of marginal effects across asset types may be tied to the ability of assets to 
generate income. This would correspond with the findings of Godquin (2004) who reports 
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that households with higher values of productive asset holdings are more likely to repay 
loans. Several studies report a positive relationship between borrower profits, which one 
may expect is positively correlated with the ownership of productive assets and loan 
repayment.
7
 Conversely, non-productive assets would generally not provide a stream of 
revenue and, thus, may be less likely to contribute positively to loan repayment. Similarly, 
productive assets may be more easily liquidated and, if so, more capable of providing the 
borrower with funds to meet payment obligations.  
In Table A5, we present results obtained when re-estimating our empirical 
specification after clustering non-land assets as either likely income-generating, or 
productive, assets (i.e., corrugated tin houses; cows; goats and lambs; sewing machines; 
vans/rickshaws; and cow-pulled vehicles) or as likely non-income-generating, or non-
productive, assets (i.e., televisions, radios and bicycles and other assets). The reasoning 
behind our categorisation is as follows. Owning a house allows rental payments to be 
avoided and can provide rental income if the individual owns more than one house. 
Somewhat similarly, ownership of cows, goats or lambs can generate income since these 
animals provide foodstuffs that reduce a borrower’s consumption expenditure. In addition, 
the animals may have offspring that can be sold, and/or they can provide revenue from the 
sale of related dairy products. Sewing machines can generate income since many women in 
rural Bangladesh engage in sewing for domestic consumption and sometimes this involves 
offering output for commercial sale. Vans/rickshaws are the most common form of 
transportation in Bangladesh. Typically, a male member of the borrower’s family drives the 
van/rickshaw and sells the service to commuters. An alternative arrangement involves the 
borrower renting the rickshaw to a driver who then sells transportation services to 
commuters. Similarly, cow-pulled vehicles are widely used in rural areas to carry 
passengers or heavy goods. As with vans/rickshaws, the sale of this transportation service 
can generate income. Finally, we categorise televisions, radio and bicycles and furniture 
and household items (i.e., other assets) as non-income-generating assets, since we do not 
expect ownership of such assets to directly affect income. There may, of course, be some 
indirect effect on repayment performance, for example better information on prices through 
radio or television or easier means of transportation using bicycles, but we do not expect 
these assets to have significant influences on borrowers’ incomes. 
As reported in Tables A3 and A 4, the marginal effects on the land variables presented 
in Table A5 are positive and significant. Marginal effects for productive assets are positive 
in all specifications; however, statistical significance is lacking. In contrast, marginal 
effects reported for non-productive assets are negative and significant in all specifications. 
Considering the ad hoc nature of our categorisation of assets as probably productive or non-
productive and, more specifically, acknowledging that corrugated tin houses may or may 
not generate income, we re-estimate the specifications for which results are presented in 
Table A5 while employing two alternative categorisations. The corresponding results are 
presented in Table A6. Columns (a) to (d) include results obtained when corrugated tin 
houses, regardless of the number a borrower owns, are categorised as likely non-productive 
assets. Columns (e) to (h) contain results obtained when corrugated tin houses are 
categorised as likely non-productive assets if the borrower owns only one house and as 
likely productive assets if the borrower owns multiple houses.  
                                                          
7. See, for example, Copestake et al. (2001), Vogelgesang (2001b), and McKernan (2002). 
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Buttressing the results presented in Tables A3 to A5, we find the estimated marginal 
effects for the land variables are positive and significant in all estimations. Likewise, the 
marginal effects of the productive assets variables are consistently positive but 
insignificant. Finally, the marginal effects of non-productive assets are negative and 
significant when the total value of assets (columns (a) and (e)) and the number of assets 
(units) are considered (columns (c) and (g)). However, contrary to the results presented in 
Table A5, we report no significant relationship between non-productive assets and loan 
repayment when average asset values (columns (b) and (f)) or shares of total (non-land) 
assets (columns (d) and (h)) are considered. This variation underscores the importance of 
asset categorisation for our empirical results; however, the consistency of results, in sign 
and statistical significance, is indicative of the extent to which our results are, generally 
speaking, robust to changes in categorisation schemes.   
 
 
Revisiting our hypotheses, we expected asset holdings to be positively associated with 
higher repayment probabilities. This is true to some extent. We report a significant, positive 
and robust relationship between land ownership and loan repayment. However, taken 
collectively, non-land assets are found to diminish the likelihood of loan repayment. We 
can say that certain asset types correspond with either increased or decreased repayment 
probabilities, yet for some other assets, no significant relationship is observed. Results 
obtained after grouping assets by their likely abilities to generate income suggest a possible 
positive relationship between loan repayment and productive assets, while non-productive 
assets are found to correspond to diminished repayment probabilities.  
The finding that land ownership is positively related to loan repayment could stem 
from a prevalence of borrowers within our sample being engaged in rural agriculture. One 
would expect that a borrower who owns land could benefit from agricultural production or, 
although perhaps a less likely occurrence, by renting a portion of their land to tenant 
farmers. Similarly, a borrower having difficulty in repaying a loan may be able, depending 
on the amount of land owned, to sell a portion of their land holdings to raise sufficient 
revenue to repay their loan. Marginal effects for the vans and rickshaws variables are also 
positive and significant. This relationship may follow from vans and rickshaws often being 
the main means of transportation in both rural areas and towns and, thus, potentially 
capable of providing a consistent source of income. Somewhat similarly, borrowers who 
own more corrugated tin houses are more likely to successfully repay their loans. This 
relationship seems very reasonable if house ownership is reflective of a borrower being 
relatively well-off or financially solvent. In addition, as noted earlier, owning a house(s) 
allows rental payments to be avoided and may provide rental income if the individual owns 
more than one house.  
The negative relationship between loan repayment and the ownership of sewing 
machines may be attributable to most sewing machines being owned by households that do 
not use them for commercial purposes. Loan officers might consider the sewing machines 
as possible income-generating assets, even though they do not contribute directly to the 
repayment of a loan. Similarly, the negative relationship between loan repayment and 
ownership of televisions, radios and bicycles could be related to such assets being used 
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infrequently for productive purposes. Ownership of such assets, particularly of televisions 
and radios, may be interpreted as a signal of wealth within a village community, since such 
technologies are less common in rural areas. While televisions and radios may be used to 
collect information on prices, it is unlikely that they have much other productive value and, 
hence, are limited in terms of income-generation. If so, it is possible that ownership of these 
assets may be misinterpreted by loan officers. As the average value of television, radio and 
bicycle holdings is not very high (only 8.6% of the typical loan value), liquidation of these 
assets would provide little assistance to a borrower in need of funds to repay a loan. As 
suggested at the outset, an alternative explanation would be that higher asset holdings could 
reflect an increased marginal propensity to consume and thus a diminished ability to repay 
the loan. Similarly, higher asset holdings, by lowering savings, may reflect borrowers 
having relatively high discount rates. Another explanation may be that borrowers owning 
these assets are, in general, more affluent and, thus, have less motivation to maintain future 
access to BRAC loans. In each case, it is plausible that asset ownership could be negatively 
related to loan repayment. 
Common intuition may lead some to think that asset ownership is very important for 
loan repayment, but our results suggest that the relationship between asset ownership and 
loan repayment is much more complicated. Generally speaking, we find that, although 
ownership of some assets significantly affects the probability of repayment, the presence or 
absence of such assets does little to change the likelihood of a loan being repaid. Other 
factors appear to explain a large proportion of the probability of repayment. A short, but 
non-exhaustive, list would probably include: general efficiency in the initial processing of 
borrower applications; individual borrower’s behaviour and non-quantifiable borrower-
specific attributes (ability, drive, ambition, and so forth); use of leased/rented assets 
(including land); individual borrower’s income and savings; group monitoring; asset 
ownership of parents, friends and relatives; debt owed by other family members; and the 
quality of the loan officer. This being said, assets are not irrelevant for loan repayment and 
loan officers should not dismiss asset holdings when evaluating potential borrowers. Much 
to the contrary, MFIs may wish to discount a borrower’s likely ability to repay a loan based 
on ownership of non-productive assets or to place a greater weight on the assets that we 
have categorised as productive.  
 
 
Using data for 34,255 BRAC microloans taken by 12,455 borrowers during the 2002-6 
period, we have estimated a series of binomial probit specifications to consider whether and 
to what extent assets and other non-asset variables determine the probability of successful 
loan repayment. In doing so, we extend the literature by revealing the relationships between 
various types of asset holdings and loan repayment. Heterogeneity is reported across asset 
types with respect to their influences on loan repayment. Broadly defined, borrower’s 
holdings of productive assets are positively related to loan repayment, while ownership of 
non-productive assets is found to significantly decrease the probability of repayment.  
Although different types of assets affect the probability of repayment in significant yet 
contrary ways, in the bigger picture the collective influence of asset holdings on loan 
repayment is relatively minor. Since MFIs routinely assess potential borrowers’ asset 
holdings prior to extending credit, our findings may suggest that MFIs weigh assets too 
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heavily when determining the creditworthiness of borrowers. Loan officers may wish to 
consider the borrower’s use of certain assets on a case-by-case basis to determine whether 
they are likely to generate income and, hence, to aid in loan repayment. Assets such as 
sewing machines and bicycles may or may not be used for productive purposes and assets 
such as televisions and radios, while perhaps not likely to generate income, may be used to 
gather information on prices that increase the borrower’s real income. Furthermore, loan 
officers may wish to give more importance to the quality of assets, in terms of their values 
and potential productivity, rather than their quantity.  
As one would expect, we find that borrowers who make advanced payments during 
the repayment period have a higher likelihood of successful loan repayment and borrowers 
who periodically miss payments are more likely to default. A greater number of income-
earning members in a borrower’s household increases the probability of repayment; 
however, as the number of members in the family increases, the probability of repayment 
decreases. When evaluating repeat borrowers, it may be useful for MFIs to seek borrowers 
who sometimes make advance payments, since such borrowers usually repay their loans. 
MFIs should also encourage loans to households with many income-earning members and 
might discourage providing loans to large families or those with relatively fewer income-
earning members. Finally, MFIs should be cautious about giving high-value loans as such 
loans tend to have a higher default rate.  
While our findings have policy implications for MFIs that may contribute to better 
targeting of borrowers and, hence, higher loan repayment rates, there remains considerable 
room for additional research. For example, related research may include examination of the 
importance of asset holdings as a means of screening potential defaulters, as a determinant 
of borrower’s defaulting on their first loans, or as indicative of the timing of defaults over 
the repayment period or with respect to the ordering of loans taken by individuals. 
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Variable: (a) (b) (c) 
    Land (in acres) 0.0006** 0.0005*** 0.0005** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Value of total (non-land) assets -2.6E-08** -2.4E-08*** -2.2E-08** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Previous loan principle -3.3E-06*** -2.4E-06*** -2.3E-06*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Duration of loan (in weeks) 0.0056*** 0.0034*** 0.0031*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0009) 
Loan interest rate -0.0018** -0.0002 -0.0001 
 
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Missed any payment (dummy) -0.0516*** -0.0616* -0.07* 
 
(0.0037) (0.0332) (0.0382) 
Made any payment in advance (dummy) 0.056*** 0.0397*** 0.0382*** 
 
(0.0069) (0.0062) (0.0036) 
Number of prior BRAC loans 0.0024** 0.0019** 0.0016 
 
(0.0012) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age of borrower 0.0027*** 0.0023*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
Age of borrower squared -0.000038*** -3.4E-05*** -2.8E-05*** 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Household members, total -0.0014** -0.0012** -0.001*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Income-earners in household 0.004*** 0.0036*** 0.0027*** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Married (dummy) -0.0009 -0.0004 0.0011 
 
(0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0088) 
    Time (month/year) dummies No Yes Yes 
Geographic (region) dummies No No Yes 
N 34,255 34,255 34,255 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1938 0.248 0.2607 
Log likelihood full model -4,312.49 -4,022.22 -3,954.32 
Count R
2
 0.965 0.967 0.966 
 
Notes: Marginal effects reported with standard errors in parentheses. ‘***’, "**", and ‘*’ denotes significance 
from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Asset measure: 
Total value 
of assets 
Average 
asset value 
Number of 
assets 
(units) 
Share of 
total (non-
land) assets 
Variables: (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Land (in acres) 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Corrugated tin houses 3.5E-08 1.3E-08 0.0033* 0.0042 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0019) (0.0029) 
Cows 3.2E-08 2.1E-07 -0.0001 0.0033 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0032) 
Goats and lambs 7.4E-07 1.3E-06 0.0006 0.0046 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0094) 
Sewing machines -1.3E-06* -1.6E-06** -0.0067*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0019) (0.0085) 
Televisions, radios and bicycles -6.4E-07*** -9.3E-07*** -0.0045*** -0.018*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0039) 
Vans/rickshaws 8.7E-07*** 1.2E-06*** 0.0044*** 0.0113 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0013) (0.0069) 
Vehicles (cow-pulled) -1.4E-06* -1.7E-06** 0.0002 0.0167 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0038) (0.0423) 
Other miscellaneous assets -1.0E-07*** ---- ---- -0.0124*** 
 
(0.0000) ---- ---- (0.0026) 
Previous loan principle -2.2E-06*** -2.2E-06*** -2.2E-06*** -2.1E-06*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Duration of loan (in weeks) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Loan interest rate -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Missed any payment (dummy) -0.0715* -0.0717* -0.0714* -0.0743** 
 
(0.0376) (0.0376) (0.0377) (0.0377) 
Made any payment in advance (dummy) 0.0375*** 0.0374*** 0.0378*** 0.0375*** 
 
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0038) 
Number of prior BRAC loans 0.0014* 0.0014* 0.0014* 0.0011* 
 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
Age of borrower 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.0019*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Age of borrower squared -2.8E-05*** -2.7E-05*** -2.8E-05*** -2.7E-05*** 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Household members, total -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
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Asset measure: 
Total 
value of 
assets 
Average 
asset value 
Number of 
assets 
(units) 
Share of 
total (non-
land) 
assets 
Variables: (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Income-earners in household 0.0027*** 0.0028*** 0.0025** 0.0026*** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
Married (dummy) 0.0005 0.0004 0.0007 -0.0011 
 
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.009) (0.0088) 
Constant -0.1278 -0.1125 -0.1621 -0.07 
 
(0.628) (0.6321) (0.665) (0.6359) 
N 34,255 34,255 34,255 34,255 
Pseudo R
2
 0.2608 0.2651 0.265 0.2648 
Log likelihood full model -3,953.99 -3,930.97 -3,931.19 -3,932.53 
Count R
2
 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966 
Notes: See Table A3. Time (month and year) and geographic region dummy variables included in all estimations; 
however, coefficients are not reported here. 
  
 
Asset measure: 
Total value 
of assets 
Average 
asset value 
Number of 
assets 
(units) 
Share of 
total (non-
land) assets 
Variables: (a) (b) (c) (d) 
     Land (in acres) 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Income-generating assets 1.8E-08 -7.7E-09 0.0008 0.004 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0029) 
Non-income-generating assets -1.5E-07*** -9.5E-07*** -0.0046*** -0.0143*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0017) (0.003) 
Previous loan principle -2.3E-06*** -2.2E-06*** -2.2E-06*** -2.1E-06*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Duration of loan (in weeks) 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Loan interest rate -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Missed any payment (dummy) -0.0709* -0.0716* -0.0703* -0.074* 
 
(0.0384) (0.0381) (0.0379) (0.0381) 
Made any payment in advance (dummy) 0.0379*** 0.0375*** 0.0377*** 0.0376*** 
 
(0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0038) 
Number of prior BRAC loans 0.0015 0.0014 0.0014* 0.0011* 
 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007) 
Age of borrower 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.0019*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Age of borrower squared -2.8E-05*** -2.7E-05*** -2.7E-05*** -2.7E-05*** 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Household members, total -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Income-earners in household 0.0026*** 0.003*** 0.0026*** 0.0025*** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.0009) 
Married (dummy) 0.0005 0.0012 0.0015 -0.0009 
 
(0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.009) 
N 34,255 34,255 34,255 34,255 
Pseudo R
2
 0.267 0.2625 0.2633 0.2626 
Log likelihood full model -3,920.99 -3,944.98 -3,940.45 -3,944.24 
Count R
2
 0.967 0.966 0.966 0.966 
 
Notes: See Table A4. 
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